An Analysis of Tacit British Involvement in the Bahraini Crackdown

( The BBC reports British troops training Saudi forces to crush the Bahraini uprising) 

As the Middle East goes deeper into the flames of resentment and civil disobedience, it has also witnessed the existing ruling elites of countries from Libya to Bahrain being ever more determined to remain in power. To make things darker, Middle Eastern strongmen have been cooperating with each other to put down domestic uprisings such as Syria flying Libyan jets to bomb protesters or Iran providing assistance to the Syrian regime on crowd control tactics while the West acts like a peacemaker. However the real truth is that the West has been playing a very dangerous double game of supporting uprisings in non friendly states like Libya while covertly assisting the repression of public sentiment in pro western countries. And no country plagued by this wave of revolutionary unrest could prove a better example than Bahrain. As the protest movement in Bahrain slowly withers away reports show that the British military did provide weapons and training to the Saudi National Elite guards that were deployed to crush the Bahraini revolt. Meanwhile Britain did continue its training and advising of top Bahraini military officers as the crackdown intensified.  

(Saudi forces enter Bahrain to quash the insurrection) 

After all, apart from Sunni Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf, the UK and the US stand to lose the most from a successful Bahraini uprising. Firstly a successful Bahraini uprising could seriously threaten the presence of the US Fifth Fleet and British Royal Navy in Bahrain which happens to be the ultimate bulwark against Iranian military superiority in Persian Gulf. The combined US and British presence there also guarantees Saudi energy and airspace security against Iranian missiles and planes thus weakening Iran’s ability to intimidate the Saudis into accepting Iranian designs for the Middle East. Secondly was to prevent a spill over of the Bahraini insurrection into the heavily Shia populated Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia which is the location of much of Saudi energy reserves. This is to prevent the Saudis from being too distracted with domestic unrest that it takes its eye of Al-Qaeda whose presence has been growing in Yemen and blocks it from filling up the emerging geopolitical vacuum in Iraq as the US leaves and competing with Iran for influence throughout the region. Meanwhile growing unrest in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province could also send world oil prices higher, hurting the oil dependent economies of the US and the UK while boosting political and economic instability in highly volatile and anti western countries with Western allied governments like Pakistan and Yemen. Higher oil prices could also mean a financially stronger Russia, Iran and Venezuela thus giving them more room to ease domestic pressure at home while boosting their regional influence to the detriment of the US and the UK. US and British strategists also fear that the overthrow of the Bahraini monarchy could undermine the so called invincibility of Sunni Arab monarchies in the region thus weakening the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy. The British could have also provided the continued training as part of their long term plan to maintain and expand their influence in the Persian Gulf. For the Saudis getting British military assistance is a vital step towards diversifying their dependence on foreign security thus preserving its sovereignty and freedom of action. 

  

(US naval forces conduct an exercise in the Persian Gulf.)

However like all major covert operations they are accompanied by huge risks that prove to be very damaging if properly manipulated by hostile powers. Among those risks is that it would show that so called Western support for the Arab spring is highly duplicitous in which repressive pro Western regimes are backed while unfriendly regimes in Syria, Libya and Iran are bashed up. This in turn could damage the West’s improved image earned by its handling of the Libya and Egypt crises, while paving the way for greater anti Western sentiment in the region. Anti Americanism could also grow as Britain is one of the strongest US allies and viewed by many Middle Easterners as an accomplice of the US. These sentiments are highly undesirable as Western governments struggle to accommodate with new and existing Middle Eastern regimes that are highly susceptible to domestic public pressures.  

The second risk posed by the British involvement in the Bahraini crackdown is a possible increase of distrust and anger among Bahrainis towards foreign powers. After all the Shia Bahrainis being so angered by the deployment of Saudi and UAE troops to crush their revolt could also become equally angry about the British role in assisting those forces with weapons and training. As a consequence Shia Bahrainis’ distrust of foreigners will grow, intensifying anger against not just the UK but also the US as Britain is viewed as America’s accomplice and that it had approved of the British decision at some point privately as it had a web of interests at stake. Ultimately this could play into Iran’s hands if popular opinion wants the US and British military personnel out of their territory as it would make it the dominant power in the region.

The tacit British support for the Bahraini crackdown could also foment greater distrust and anger towards Britain and possibly America among the Shia populations of Iraq and Lebanon and Iran. The Shias of those countries did in fact come out in the thousands to protest against the Saudi led military intervention in Bahrain and could possibly do the same against Britain and the US. This is especially serious in Iraq where the US is trying to secure an extended time frame for the US troop presence there to counter Iran’s increasing power in Iraq. It could also weaken the ability of British and American companies to obtain valuable Iraqi oil contracts in the future leaving other rivals like China, Russia Iran enjoy the profits. Meanwhile greater anger against the Britain and America could be used by Iran to silence dissent at home. Tehran’s usual tactics of accusing its opponents of cooperating with the UK and the US would become more effective as they capitalize on a stronger anti Western sentiment. Tehran could also use this anger against Britain to consolidate anti British and anti American sentiment to justify its repressive police state while diverting attention away from its growing economic troubles thus enabling Tehran to weather the current political storm in the Middle East. The rulers of Iran could exploit the British aided crackdown in Bahrain to solidify their original response to the Bahraini crackdown in which it blamed the US. Iran could say that the US would have given the green light to Britain to assist in the crackdown as Britain is the strongest of the US allies and shares many interests in Bahrain.  The result could well be greater anti Americanism in the Middle East and a resurrection of Iran’s credentials as the strongest defender of the Muslim world against US and UK aggression, helping it to gain support while deflecting attention away from its repressive domestic actions. 

The British involvement in the Bahraini crackdown could also play into Al Qaeda and other hardline Saudi Islamists especially when Saudi Arabia falls victim to revolutionary unrest as it gives them solid evidence regarding British backed repression in their country. Al Qaeda would also use it to demonstrate Saudi cooperation with infidel Westerners primarily the US and the UK in repressing the will of the Saudis, giving it more room to expand the appeal of its violent ideology. 

However the potential fallout of British involvement in the Bahraini crackdown can largely be contained if the British and the Americans are successful distracting the Arab public and if Iran decides not to respond. And the current situation shows that, that is just happening. The escalating violence in Yemen, reports of torture in Syria, a possible ceasefire in Libya and growing power tussle in Iran have all added to the complex of distractions that have made the official admission of British involvement in the Bahraini crackdown surprisingly quiet. Nevertheless an absolutely silent aftermath cannot be ruled out as Iran mentioned earlier stands to profit the most from its revelation to the Arab public. Among Iran’s options to divert Arab attention to British support for the crackdown would be to issue a severe official condemnation of British involvement. Any official condemnation has to be made either by Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran or President Ahamadinejad. Iran could also get highly popular pro Iran politicians in Iraq and Lebanon such as Moqtada al Sadr and Hassan Nasrallah respectively to condemn British actions. Iran could also covertly organize and fund various NGOs and political parties across Iraq, Pakistan and Lebanon into holding demonstrations against Britain and possibly America. These tactics are very useful to divert attention towards a particular issue as it was seen though out the Middle East when Saudi led forces entered Bahrain to quash the revolt. Protests attracting thousands were seen in Iraq Pakistan, Lebanon and even among the Saudi Arabian and Indian Shia communities even though global attention was initially fixed on Libya thus elevating the Bahraini uprising to the centre of attention while seriously damaging Saudi Arabia’s reputation. Iran could also try another tactic which is to send violent thugs or mobs to intimidate workers at the British embassies of Tehran, Baghdad and Beirut which is another successful tried and tested tactic to grab attention. In fact Iran had actually employed that move against Saudi Arabia as a form of retaliation when it sent troops to quash the Bahraini rebellion. 

  

(Iranian students hurl firebombs at the Saudi embassy in Tehran to protest Saudi actions in Bahrain.) 

Nevertheless it is not a losing situation for the UK and to a lesser extent the US as there are some severe obstacles to Iran’s ability to carry out those operations. Among those obstacles are the intensifying power struggle between the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad. The unsually public spat between the two leaders has engulfed the Iranian national security and intelligence apparatus forcing many Iranian politicians to rethink their alliances and shore up domestic support. This in turn acts as a highly useful political distraction that limits Iran’s ability to influence events outside as its leaders are too preoccupied with domestic power politics. Secondly Iranian leaders are also stuck with other serious economic and financial complications as the EU prepares to impose another round of economic sanctions against Iranian banks. After all growing economic pressure on its banking system would undermine the financial strength of Iranian leaders while sowing greater unrest at home. Iran is also preoccupied with more serious regional geopolitical developments such as the possible relocation of Hamas’ headquarters from Syria to Qatar which could see Iran’s influence over Hamas, the Levant region and the Arab Israeli conflict decline. Iranian leaders are also struggling to cope with the Syrian Uprising whose success must be halted to prevent a greater loss of Iranian influence in the region and to curtail greater unrest in Iran. Besides, Iran might also be choosing not to condemn the UK due to its involvement in Syria, as possible Western and Arab diplomatic retaliation could thrust Iranian covert support to Al Assads back into the spotlight. The stakes are higher for Iran now ever since the reports of the torture and murder of a 13 year Syrian boy at the hands of Syrian security forces. Finally all of those developments have significantly diverted Iranian attention thus blocking it from exploiting British involvement in Bahrain for now at least.

 

  

                                         

Why Iran Wants The Syrian Uprising Crushed

With two Arab dictators toppled and other Arab regimes shaking, the initial analysis of the simmering protests in Syria was that is was not very serious. In fact analysts speculated that the protests would be confined to the agricultural town of Deraa whose residents have been financially hit by a drought. However massive repression by security forces along with the failure of the Baathist regime headed by President Bashar Al-Assad to deliver concessions such as lifting the country’s 48 year emergency law quickly caused the protests to spread. Now with a serious possibility of the Baathist regime’s hold on Syria being severely weakened if not toppled, its closest ally Iran, has taken the decision to shore up the regime. The US government has alleged that Iran has been providing Syrian security forces with anti riot gear, advanced crowd control technology and street control tactics to discourage protests which Iran had developed by itself during the aftermath of the disputed 2009 Iranian Presidential Election. Iran is not helping the Syrian regime out of love but out of necessity. If regime change were to occur, Iran would be in a nightmare scenario as too many of its interests coincide with the Al-Assads. These interests can be divided into economic, political strategic and security interests. 

Among Iran’s economic interests in Syria are billions of dollars in investments in the Syrian economy. Over the years Iran has invested in Syria’s automobile, cement, energy and power generation industries. Those investments represent billions of dollars and more importantly provide vast profits for Iran’s privileged elite. Iran already the third largest foreign investor in Syria plans more investments in a bid to consolidate its economic presence there. It has proposed a joint Iranian-Syrian bank that could be used to ease some of the economic pressure on Iran and expand Iran’s influence over cash flows from and within Syria. Besides that Iran also has growing trade ties with Syria. For example Iran has just signed a free trade agreement with Syria and hopes to boost annual trade to US$ 5 billion. The reason behind this is to allow Iranian products to gain greater access to markets thus easing its domestic economic problems and its international economic isolation. Secondly is to compete with gulf Arab states for economic influence in Syria which it desperately lacks. However Iran’s current trade and economic interests, along with its future economic plans with Syria could be undermined if regime change takes place. This is because not everyone in Syria wants to open their country to more Iranian influence. After all, Syria is overwhelmingly Sunni and a significant portion of the Sunni Syrian community subscribe to the highly conservative Salafist movement which has been growing steadily over the years in Syria. This Salafist Islamist view at its extreme considers the Shias as heretics and is therefore hostile towards Iran which is heavily Shia. This hostility has been compounded by Iran’s meddling in Syrian politics which include backing the repressive Syrian security apparatus and frequent attempts by wealthy Iranians to convert Sunni Syrians to Shia Islam.

 

Iran also has many strategic interests in sustaining the Al-Assad family in power. Among them is Iran’s desire to maintain its influence in the Levant and over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran has done so in the past by funding Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine with hundreds of millions of dollars annually and supplying it with military supplies, training and advice. So far, due to the current Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian policies toward these groups, the only secure and stable supply line from Iran to those groups is through Syria. Therefore if the Al-Assads are replaced by Sunni rulers, there could be a strong possibility of those supply lines being shut down. This is due to hostility to Iran in Syria as well as the possibility of the new rulers of Syria being more aligned to Saudi Arabia than Iran. Saudi Arabia is deeply suspicious and hostile to those groups. For example the new rulers of Syria, in coordination with the Sunni Syrian business elite, could offer to end the supply lines in order to gain financial and economic benefits, a lever that Iran cannot provide Syria due to its own economic problems. Syria’s economy is in a very weak condition and has suffered further blows during this wave of unrest, and this situation has started to hurt even the Sunni business elite in Syria who have traditionally enjoyed good relations with the Al-Assad regime. The issue of supply lines is something that Iran cannot afford because it would weaken its influence over those militant groups especially Hezbollah as Iran’s main leverage with Hezbollah comes from military supplies, and training. As a consequence, Iran’s influence in the Levant and over the Arab-Israeli conflict would be seriously weakened, which also happen to be the pillars of the Iranian strategy to become the dominant power in the region. Iran has consistently manipulated Arab-Israeli relations in order to ratchet up hatred against the West and to undermine the credibility of Arab leaders, while propping up their image as the defender of the Arabs thus giving it more sway in the Arab streets. This in turn strengthens Iran’s bargaining position with not just Western powers but also powerful Sunni Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran has also used groups like Hezbollah as a trump card in times of emergency and tension for either getting concessions from the West or diverting attention. For example Iran has been accused in the past by the US of encouraging the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war in order to divert attention from stalled nuclear talks between Iran and six world powers.

  

            Secondly, Iran could be skilfully using the crisis in Syria to its advantage by expanding its influence in Syria while blocking other Arab states mainly Saudi Arabia from expanding their influence there. The consensus among the Middle East heavyweights such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia is that Bashar Al-Assad should remain in power for their own interests. Iran sees this as a possibility of other regimes especially the Saudis to expand their influence in Syria at the expense of Iran. Iran worries that this new found influence could be used to undermine the Iran Syria alliance, weakening Iran’s position further in the Middle East. The Iranians also want to end the crisis in Syria as soon as possible to prevent Syria’s weak economy from hurting further. Iran fears that a prolonged crisis in Syria could hurt the Sunni business elite very badly, making the Al-Assads more vulnerable to pressure to accept large capital flows from Saudi Arabia to ease the pain. Saudi Arabia in turn could make Syria more independent from Iran and could amass enough leverage to force the Al-Assads to choke off weapons supplies to Hezbollah and other militant groups. However by aiding Syria this problem could be contained and Iran could ultimately end up having more influence over Syria as the Al-Assads become more dependent on Iranian regime survival. For example Iran could use its training of Syrian security forces to expand its contacts and penetration inside Syria’s security and intelligence apparatus. Meanwhile with Syria in need of Iranian help and being busy in ensuring regime survival, Iran could also expand its influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah and other groups.

            Another vital reason for Iran’s active backing of the Syrian regime is to safeguard its own appeal in the Arab world, its interests in Iraq and above all its own domestic situation which happens to be tied to the situation in Syria. Iran is nervous about the possible Sunni takeover of Syria because it could boost the Salafist movement in Syria. Although it enjoys widespread influence in Syrian society it is does not have institutions and a strong organizational structure due to official repression. However this could all change if the Sunnis come to power as many of them subscribe to its beliefs. Iran believes this could result in an explosion of anti Iran sentiment in Syria at a time of the great upheaval in the Middle East. These sentiments are due to Iranian interference in Syria, and the actions of wealthy Iranians who pay Sunni Syrians to convert to Shia Islam. The Salafist interpretation of Islam at its extreme considers Shias as apostates. On an overall basis, this situation could amplify distrust and suspicion towards Iran in the Middle East ultimately weakening its position further. Iran is also worried that a Sunni takeover of Syria could unleash a wave of sectarian bloodshed, as the Sunnis (the traditional power in Syria) exact revenge from the Baathist regime which had brutally repressed Sunni Muslim uprisings in Syria on many occasions, most notably the 1982 Hama massacre which killed 10000-40000 people and which had also subjected the Sunnis to massive repression. The majority of the regime’s leaders including the Al-Assads and security personnel are Allawis, an offshoot of Shia Islam. Iran wants to avoid this because this sectarianism could spread to Iraq both have sizable Sunni and Shia communities. This could happen because a Sunni takeover of Syria could inspire the Sunni Iraqis who have frequently complained about Shia based discrimination that it is still possible to challenge Baghdad. Besides that, the Syrian border with Iraq which has been sealed off to Sunni militants crossing the border to Iraq risks being reopened as a destabilized Syria sees its security forces diverted to quell uprisings in urban areas and not to police activities along the border areas. Regime change in Syria may even worsen this situation as cross border militant activity take place at greater ease due to either a security vacuum in Syria and/or a Sunni takeover of Syria which could see direct support for the insurgency from Syria. This fears Iran because it could weaken the already fragile Iraqi government reigniting greater Sunni Shia tensions. Iran does not want to see massive Sunni versus Shia bloodletting because it could create so much hostility and distrust between the groups to an extent in which their Shia dominated country suffers greater credibility blows and finds its ability to expand its influence being weakened. Iran also worries that the sectarian spill over from Syria to Iraq could mean a longer US presence in Iraq which is something that Iran resents. Iran has been waiting for those troops to leave because it believes that the main bulwark towards Iran’s expansion of its influence in Iraq would be removed.  Not only would the balance of power in Iraq tilt towards pro Iran militias and segments of the Iraqi armed forces, but also increase the government of Iraq’s dependence on security guarantees from Iran. Iran will also be in a better position to intimidate Iraq’s weak military thus holding a better negotiating position with Iraq in the future. Besides that Iran would be able to deter the US from harming its nuclear facilities from Iraq and finally strengthen its ability to build a buffer zone in Iraq to protect its western flank. Iran would also face fewer constraints when it conducts cross border crackdowns on Iranian dissident groups as Iraq neither has the intelligence or military capability to prevent such a possibility. Now with the crisis unfolding in Syria, the ability to execute those plans is under attack.

            A successful ouster of the Al-Assads from power in Syria could also have direct consequences on Iran’s own domestic security and stability. If the Sunnis were to take power in Syria from the Allawis, Iran’s own Sunni community who suffer from great poverty and massive repression could be inspired to challenge the Iranian regime at home. This means potentially greater unrest in the Iranian provinces of Baluchistan and Khuzestan. In Khuzestan greater unrest among the Sunni Ahwazi Arabs could lead to greater insecurity for Iran’s energy resources as most of Iran’s oil and gas is located in the province. What’s more disturbing for Iran is that these provinces are already experiencing low intensity conflicts and militant groups in both Khuzestan and Baluchistan, including al Qaeda affiliated Jundallah which receives funding from Saudi Arabia. An escalation of those conflicts would exacerbate Iran’s centrifugal forces, strengthen the Saudis bargaining position with Iran and divert Iranian attention towards quelling domestic uprisings thus giving it less room to expand its influence in the Middle East. Finally it could also focus global attention to the plight of Sunnis in Iran and thus undermine its reputation in the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab world.  

            Iran also knows that chaos spilling over from Syria into Iraq in an event of regime change could complicate the efforts of Iraqi leaders to crackdown on Iranian dissident groups operating in northern Iraq such as Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK)  and Party For A Free Life In Kurdistan (PEJAK) that want to overthrow the mullahs from power. The MEK organization has long been involved in a complex of bombings and assassinations in Iran and has also been involved in supplying valuable intelligence to the US regarding Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities. PEJAK too was responsible for a lot of damage, including inciting Iranian Kurds to rise up against the mullahs resulting in hundreds of Iranian military fatalities. Therefore Iran has pressured the Iraqi government for years to crackdown on those groups with little success until now due to US military protection. However if Iraq goes back into chaos, the US military could stay on and could allow Washington enough leverage to pressure the Iraqi government not to do so. For example Iraqi forces recently raided Camp Ashraf in Diyala province, the bastion of the MEK killing 34 people, but have refrained from destroying the camp as Iran’s leaders have demanded due to US pressure. Iran therefore wants the US out so that it can ensure swift action on both the MEK and PEJAK. Another reason is that with chaos spilling in from Syria, Iraqi forces’ resources could be diverted to tackling Sunni militants and would leave Iraq’s leaders with too many distractions to start cracking down on Iranian dissident groups thus giving them more breathing space in its existing safe haven, ultimately giving them a better chance to take advantage of a more unstable Iran.

            Chaos and regime change in Syria has the potential to create more instability in Iran’s Kurdistan province. This is due to the possibility of surging Kurdish nationalism in Syria along with their desire to use the instability there to assert their calls for a Kurdish state. These ideas could soon get attention in Turkey and Kurdish dominated areas in Syria might become a safe haven for Kurdish resistance in Turkey led by the Kurdistan Workers Party, the sister organization of PEJAK. This could ultimately boost Kurdish unrest in Turkey and in Iraq. Meanwhile greater Sunni-Shia tensions spilling over from Syria into Iraq could allow Kurdish leaders in Iraq to skilfully assert themselves, while Baghdad remains distracted. All these factors along with anti Iran groups being able to manoeuvre easily could inspire and embolden Kurdish resistance in Iran, while making it more complicated for Tehran to quash the unrest as Kurdish rebels have a breathing space in northern Iraq, ultimately making Iran’s leaders more vulnerable. 

             While all these factors above might be short term concerns, Iran also has some long term interests in helping to preserve the current political order in Syria. Many of these interests coincide with Iran’s long term security. Currently one of the prime long term concerns of Iran and coincidentally Syria is the possibility of a resurgent Iraq. As Iran has learnt bitterly in the past, a highly aggressive and assertive Iraq will limit it’s ability to expand its influence in the Middle East, prevent it from dominating the Persian Gulf militarily, and more importantly undermine stability in the highly strategic and resource rich province of Khuzestan where Arab nationalism can be a fiery card for Iraq. Worse still, a strong Iraq could also force Iran to adopt a defensive stance in its foreign policy thus making it vulnerable to foreign pressure, and outright invasion. After all Iraq has the world’s third largest oil reserves which means it still can propel itself back to power. Nevertheless, Iran has a lot of room to contain this possibility and a pro Iran regime in Syria is essential. Iran needs access to the Syrian airfields so that it can launch reconnaissance and offensive strike operations deep inside Iraq from its western flank. Furthermore, Iran will need a stable and militarily powerful Syria that is tilted to its interests to act as a counterweight to Iraq in the future, and which is willing to deploy a huge military presence to the Iraqi border to prevent Iraq from deploying the full force of its military might to the Iranian border. Finally it could also allow the destabilization campaigns to be launched from the west of Iraq at ease. After all, if not for those tactics being implemented during the Iran Iraq war, Tehran would have fallen to Saddam.

            Iran also has a deep desire to maintain its naval presence in Syria which it may not be able to do so if the Al-Assads are toppled and especially if Syria falls into the hands of the Sunnis who are hostile to Iran. The naval presence allows Iran to get a foothold in the Mediterranean and obtain sensitive intelligence on other countries in the region such as Israel. This naval base also facilitates greater naval cooperation between Syria and Iran thus allowing it to secure its position in Syria.

            Finally, since 2007 it has been acknowledged that Syria has been at the forefront of Iran’s strategy to acquire and preserve a nuclear weapons arsenal. Iran had actually encouraged Syria to acquire nuclear weapons and had reportedly paid US$2 billion to North Korea for a nuclear reactor for weapons in Syria. The reactor was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in 2007. This is all part of Iran’s desire to have a fall back option in case its nuclear assets in Iran come under attack and to consolidate its position in Syria. However Iran has not been willing to engage in such sophisticated cooperation with any other state so far and it would certainly not do so if the Al-Assads are thrown out as Syria would certainly become very unstable for a while with the strong possibility of a Sunni takeover that is suspicious and hostile to Iran. Therefore Iran’s nuclear weapons strategy could be dealt a big blow if regime change happens in Syria.